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Abstract
A network payoff function assigns a utility to all participants in a (social) net-
work. In this paper we discuss properties of such network payoff functions that
guarantee the existence of certain types of pairwise stable networks and the con-
vergence of certain network formation processes. In particular we investigate
network payoff functions that admit an exact network potential or an ordinal
network potential. We relate these network potentials to exact and ordinal po-
tentials of a non-cooperative network formation game based on consent in link
formation. Our main results extend and strengthen the current insights in the
literature on game theoretic approaches to social network formation.
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Since the introduction of the notion of pairwise stability in Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996), one of the main research questions that have been investigated in the litera-
ture on social network formation, has been the problem of the existence of (strictly)
pairwise stable networks. A related question is whether certain network formation
processes converge to these types of stable networks. Preliminary investigation of
these issues was addressed in Jackson and Watts (2001) and Jackson and Watts
(2002b). Here we investigate the fundamental properties of network payoff struc-
tures that bear on these two fundamental problems. We show that the admittance
of (ordinal) network potential functions provides a powerful tool that satisfactorily
resolves these fundamental problems.
We consider undirected social networks, which are founded on the principle that
each link is between two equally participating players. Hence, both players are as-
sumed to consent voluntarily and in full knowledge to the formation of a link between
them.1 This idea was ﬁrst formalized by Myerson (1991, page 448) as a normal form
game—referred to as the “Consent Game”. Myerson’s Consent Game and its vari-
ations unfortunately admit a multitude of Nash equilibria as pointed out in Dutta,
van den Nouweland, and Tijs (1998), Jackson (2005b), and Gilles, Chakrabarti, and
Sarangi (2005a). From this rather unsatisfactory fact, there emerged two alternative
theories of network formation under consent.
In their seminal paper Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) introduced a link-based ap-
proach to network formation. The central strategic concept is now the link rather
than the players between whom this link is formed. In particular, they deﬁned the
link-based notion of pairwise stability as an alternative description of the require-
ment of consent in link formation. This alternative formulation of stability reduces
the multitude of acceptable networks. Existence of pairwise stable networks and the
convergence of simple link-based improvement processes to such pairwise stable net-
works has been addressed in Jackson and Watts (2001), Jackson and Watts (2002a),
and Jackson and Watts (2002b).
The other approach to resolve the problem of the indeterminacy of Myerson’s
Consent Game is to consider network-based reﬁnements of the Nash equilibrium con-
cepts within the context of Myerson’s Consent Game and its variations. This has been
pursued by Gilles, Chakrabarti, and Sarangi (2005a) and Gilles and Sarangi (2005a)
1The alternative is to consider directed social networks, in which links are formed without the con-
sent of one of the players. We refer to Bala and Goyal (2000) and related subsequent work for a study
of these so-called Nash networks.
1for the case that the formation of links is costly. Gilles and Sarangi (2005a) con-
sider myopic learning processes based on the formation of simple belief systems. In
these belief systems a player formulates expectations about whether other players
would consent to forming links with her. Each player now formulates a best response
to her formed myopic beliefs. This learning process only converges satisfactorily if
the formed beliefs are conﬁrmed within the stable state that is reached. Gilles and
Sarangi show that the resulting set of these so-called self-conﬁrming equilibria gen-
erate a strict subset of the class of pairwise stable networks, the so-called strictly
pairwise stable networks. Gilles and Sarangi (2005a) do not address under which
conditions such strictly pairwise stable networks exist.
Here we show that if the network payoff function admits a potential function, the
existence of such strictly pairwise stable networks is guaranteed and, therefore, that
the learning processes based on the formation of the myopic belief systems intro-
duced by Gilles and Sarangi (2005a) indeed converge to self-conﬁrming equilibrium
networks. Furthermore we explore the relationship of these network potentials with
the improvement processes discussed by Jackson and Watts (2002a).
Two seminal contributions to the game theoretic literature address the introduc-
tion of potential functions into the analysis of cooperative as well as non-cooperative
games. These potential functions were seminally introduced by Hart and Mas-Colell
(1989) for cooperative games and by Monderer and Shapley (1996) for non-coopera-
tive games. Hart and Mas-Colell showed the fundamental relationship between
their cooperative potential function and the Shapley value for cooperative games.
(Shapley 1953) Monderer and Shapley and subsequent contributions showed that
non-cooperative games admitting potentials are closely related to congestion games
in the sense of Rosenthal (1973). These two strands of the literature were brought
together by Qin (1996) and especially Ui (2000), who showed that the payoff func-
tions in non-cooperative potential games are the Shapley values of a corresponding
class of cooperative games. These fundamental insights showed that there is a strong
relationship between the various classes of non-cooperative potential games and Hart
and Mas-Colell’s cooperative potential theory.
In the present paper we introduce potential functions for a broad class of net-
work payoff functions as descriptors of network formation fundamentals. First, we
consider exact network potentials, which assign the marginal contributions of newly
formed links to the participants in the network. The class of network payoff functions
for which such exact network potentials can be considered are exactly those network
payoff functions that satisfy Myerson (1977)’s “fairness” property—more recently re-
formulated as an equal bargaining power property. (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996, page
254) We show that a network payoff function admits an exact network potential if and
only if Myerson’s Consent Game admits a game-theoretic exact potential in the sense
of Monderer and Shapley (1996). Furthermore, we extend Qin (1996)’s equivalence
theorem by showing that, if a network payoff function admits such an exact network
potential, the network payoffs correspond in fact to the Shapley values of a certain
class of related cooperative games.
The presence of an exact network potential is a rather demanding property. It
is natural to weaken this requirement to that of the admittance of an ordinal net-
work potential function. We show that the presence of an ordinal network potential
is a strictly weaker requirement than Myerson’s Consent Game admitting a game-
theoretic ordinal potential in the sense of Monderer and Shapley (1996).
The main consequence of the presence of an ordinal potential is to guarantee the
convergence of network formation processes based on myopic payoff improvements
as introduced in Jackson and Watts (2002a) and the existence of strictly pairwise sta-
ble networks. In particular, if the network payoff function admits an ordinal network
potential, such network formation processes based on myopic payoff improvements
are shown to converge to pairwise stable networks. This generalizes the main result
in Jackson and Watts (2001). Furthermore, if Myerson’s Consent Game admits an or-
dinal potential, there exists at least one strictly pairwise stable network in the sense
of Gilles and Sarangi (2005a).
It should be clear from the developed insights in this paper that the concept of a
network potential is a very powerful one. It allows the two main questions regarding
the existence of (strictly) pairwise stable networks and the convergence of certain
network formation processes to be fully resolved.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces terminology, the
notation and the basic network formation theories. In section 3, we deﬁne exact
network potentials and their relation with the exact potentials of the Consent Game
introduced by Myerson (1991, page 448). In Section 4, we deﬁne ordinal network
potentials and their relationship with ordinal potentials of Myerson’s Consent Game.
In Section 5, we show that certain classes of network formation games admitting (or-
dinal) potentials allow the convergence of network formation processes to pairwise
stable networks and guarantee the existence of a strictly pairwise stable network, thus
linking this research to work on network formation based on myopic belief systems.
(Gilles and Sarangi 2005a) In Section 6 we look at some applications of potential
functions and some special properties of these classes of network formation games.
Section 7 concludes.
32 Preliminaries
In this section we discuss required material from non-cooperative game, cooperative
game, the theory of game theoretic potentials, and network formation theory.
2.1 Non-cooperative games and potentials
A non-cooperative game on a ﬁxed, ﬁnite player set N = {1,...,n} is given by a list
(A,π) = (Ai,πi)i∈N where for every player i ∈ N, Ai denotes an action set and
πi : A → R denotes player i’s payoff function with A = A1 × A2 × ··· × An. An
individual action of player i ∈ N is denoted by ai ∈ Ai and an action tuple is written
as a = (a1,a2,...,an) ∈ A. For every action tuple a ∈ A and player i ∈ N, we
denote by a−i = (a1,a2,...,ai−1,ai+1,...,an) ∈ A−i =
Q
j6=i Aj as the actions
selected by players other than i. π = (π1,π2,...,πn) : A → RN is the composite
payoff function of this game.
Throughout this paper, we denote a non-cooperative game for short by the pair
(A,π). A non-cooperative game is ﬁnite if for every i ∈ N, the action set Ai is ﬁnite.
In this paper, we only apply ﬁnite games.
An action set ai ∈ Ai for player i ∈ N is a best response to a−i ∈ A−i if for
every action bi ∈ Ai we have that πi(ai,a−i) > πi(bi,a−i). An action-tuple (strategy
proﬁle) a∗ ∈ A is a Nash equilibrium of the game (A,π) if for every player i ∈ N the
action ai is a best response to a−i, i.e., for every action bi ∈ Ai we have πi(a∗) >
πi(bi,a∗
−i).





is the actions selected by players other than i and j. Further, a−i,j = a−j,i.
A function Q: A → R is an exact potential of the non-cooperative game (A,π) on the
player set N if for every player i ∈ N, action tuple a ∈ A and action bi ∈ Ai,
πi(a) − πi(bi,a−i) = Q(a) − Q(bi,a−i). (1)
The notion of a game theoretic (exact) potential was seminally introduced in Mon-
derer and Shapley (1996). The potential provides a very strong relationship between
the various strategy tuples in the game; it “directs” the game towards its Nash equi-
libria (in pure strategies). Games that admit exact potentials have very powerful
4properties, including the guaranteed existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strate-
gies and the convergence of any improving dynamic improvement process to a Nash
equilibrium in a ﬁnite number of steps.
A function Q: A → R is an ordinal potential of the non-cooperative game (A,π)
on the player set N if for every player i ∈ N, action tuple a ∈ A and action bi ∈ Ai,
πi(a) − πi(bi,a−i) > 0 if and only if Q(a) − Q(bi,a−i) > 0. (2)
(A,π) is an ordinal potential game if it admits an ordinal potential. The notion of
an ordinal potential game was also introduced in Monderer and Shapley (1996).
Subsequently, Voorneveld and Norde (1997) characterized such games using weak
improvement processes. Also, every weighted potential game is an ordinal potential
game though the converse need not be true. So any property that holds for ordinal
potential games would automatically hold for exact and weighted potential games.
An ordinal (exact) potential maximizer is an action tuple a ∈ A that maximizes
the ordinal (exact) potential function Q, i.e., Q(a) > Q(b) for every b ∈ A. It is
obvious that each ordinal potential maximizer is a Nash equilibrium and, hence the
notion of a potential maximizer is a reﬁnement of the Nash equilibrium concept.
2.2 Cooperative Games
A cooperative game is fully characterized by a function v: 2N → R that assigns a
productive (output) value v(S) to a coalition S ⊂ N such that v(∅) = 0. The function
v is also called a characteristic function. An allocation x ∈ RN is feasible for the
cooperative game v if
P
i∈N xi = v(N).
The main aim of cooperative game theory is the study of allocation concepts, in
particular axiomatic allocation concepts. The main axiomatic allocation concept is
the “value”, seminally developed and characterized by Shapley (1953). The Shapley




(|S| − 1)!(n − |S|)![v(S) − v(S\{i})]
n!
. (3)
Also, from this it can be shown that
φi(v) − φj(v) =
X
S⊂N\{ij}
(|S|)!(n − |S| − 2)![v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S ∪ {j})]
(n − 1)!
. (4)
Consider the scenario that players successively join a certain coalition in a given
order. One could then assign to each player her marginal contribution to the value
5of the coalition that is created up till the moment of her entry. The Shapley value of
that player can be characterized as the average of her marginal payoffs for all possible
orders of entry. (Shapley 1971)
2.3 Networks
In this subsection we deﬁne the formal elements to describe networks. Let N =
{1,2,...,n} be a ﬁnite set of players. Two distinct players i,j ∈ N with i 6= j are
linked if i and j are related in some capacity. Usually we think of such links as
economically productive relationships between players and can either be formal con-
tracts or informal non-binding agreements. These relationships are undirected in the
sense that the two players forming a relationship are equals within that relationship.
We do not rule out that these relationships have spillover effects on the productive
relations between other players. This is captured by the formal description of such
network beneﬁts.
Formally, an (undirected) link between i and j is deﬁned as the binary set {i,j}.
Throughout we use the short-hand notation ij to denote the link {i,j}. It should be
clear that ij is completely equivalent to ji.
In total there are 1
2n(n − 1) possible links on the player set N. The collection of
these links on N is denoted by
gN = {ij | i,j ∈ N and i 6= j}. (5)
A network g is now deﬁned as an arbitrary collection of links g ⊂ gN. The collection
of all networks on N is denoted by GN = {g | g ⊂ gN} and consists of 2
1
2n(n−1) net-
works. The network gN consisting of all possible links is called the complete network
on N and the network g0 = ∅ consisting of no links is denoted as the empty network.
For every network g ∈ GN and every player i ∈ N we denote i’s neighborhood
in g by Ni(g) = {j ∈ N | j 6= i and ij ∈ g}. Player i therefore is participating in the
links in her link set Li(g) = {ij ∈ g | j ∈ Ni(g)} ⊂ g. Let Li = Li(gN) denote the
set of all possible links involving player i. We also deﬁne N(g) = ∪i∈NNi(g) and
let n(g) = #N(g) with the convention that if N(g) = ∅, we let n(g) = 1.2 Also,
ni(g) = #Ni(g).
Let for all ij ∈ g, g − ij = g\{ij}. That is, g − ij is the network that remains after
removing an existing link ij from g. Similarly, g + ij = g ∪ {ij} for all ij / ∈ g. Namely,
g + ij is the network formed by adding a new link ij to the network g. Furthermore,
2We emphasize here that if N(g) 6= ∅, we have that n(g) > 2. Namely, in those cases the network
has to consist of at least one link.
6for every set of links h ⊂ g we denote by g − h = g \ h the network resulting after
removal of all links in h. Similarly, for h ⊂ gN with h∩g = ∅, we denote g+h = g∪h
as the network resulting from adding the links in h to g.
Finally, two networks g1 and g2 are adjacent if they differ by one link, namely,
either g2 = g1 − ij for some ij ∈ g1 or g1 = g2 − ij for some ij ∈ g2.
A path in g connecting i and j is a set of distinct players {i1,i2,...,ip} ⊂ N(g)
with p > 2 such that i1 = i, ip = j, and {i1i2,i2i3,...,ip−1ip} ⊂ g. Any network for
which a path exists between any two players is said to be connected. The network
g0 ⊂ g is a component of g if for all i ∈ N(g0) and j ∈ N(g0), i 6= j, there exists a
path in g0 connecting i and j and for any i ∈ N(g0) and j ∈ N(g), ij ∈ g implies
ij ∈ g0. In other words, a component is simply a maximally connected subnetwork
of g. We denote the class of network components of the network g by C(g). The set
of players that are not connected in the network g are collected in the set of (fully)
disconnected players in g denoted by
N0(g) = N \ N(g) = {i ∈ N | Ni(g) = ∅}.
Such players are also known as “singletons”.
2.4 Link-based stability concepts for networks
We ﬁrst introduce stability concepts that allow for adding and breaking links sepa-
rately before considering them together. Note that the stability concepts introduced
below are based on the properties of the network itself rather than strategic consider-
ations of the players. This latter viewpoint has been introduced seminally by Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996) and is further advocated in Jackson and Watts (2002b), Jackson
(2005b), and Bloch and Jackson (2004).
Network formation is based on the net beneﬁts that are generated for the par-
ticipants in such a network. Formally, we introduce a network payoff function as a
function ϕ: GN → RN. To every player i ∈ N the function ϕ assigns a payoff ϕi(g)
for participating in the network g ⊂ gN. This payoff can be positive as well as neg-
ative and captures the widespread externalities of the network on the participating
players.
Deﬁnition 2.1 Let ϕ be a network payoff function on the player set N.
(a) A network g ⊂ gN is link deletion proof for ϕ if for every player i ∈ N and
every j ∈ Ni(g) it holds that ϕi(g) > ϕi(g − ij).
Denote by D(ϕ) ⊂ GN the family of link deletion proof networks for ϕ.
7(b) A network g ⊂ gN is strong link deletion proof for ϕ if for every player i ∈ N
and every h ⊂ Li(g) it holds that ϕi(g) > ϕi(g − h).
Denote by Ds(ϕ) ⊂ GN the family of strong link deletion proof networks for ϕ.
(c) A network g ⊂ gN is link addition proof if for all players i,j ∈ N with ij / ∈ g:
ϕi(g + ij) > ϕi(g) implies ϕj(g + ij) < ϕj(g).
Denote by A(ϕ) ⊂ GN the family of link addition proof networks for ϕ.
(d) A network g ∈ GN is strict link addition proof for ϕ: GN → R if for all
i,j ∈ N: ij 6∈ g implies that ϕi(g + ij) 6 ϕi(g) as well as ϕj(g + ij) 6 ϕj(g).
Denote by As(ϕ) ⊂ GN the family of strict link addition proof networks for ϕ.
The two link deletion proofness notions are based on the severance of links in a
network by individual players. In particular, the notion of link deletion proofness
considers the stability of a network with regard to the deletion of a single link. (This
concept has been introduced seminally in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).) Strong
link deletion proofness considers the possibility that a player can delete any subset
of her existing links. Clearly, strong link deletion proofness implies link deletion
proofness. For further details on this concept we refer to Gilles, Chakrabarti, Sarangi,
and Badasyan (2005) and Bloch and Jackson (2004).
Similarly, link addition proofness (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996) considers the ad-
dition of a single link by two consenting players to an existing network. A network
is link addition proof if for every pair of non-linked players, if one of these two play-
ers has positive beneﬁts from adding a link between them, the other player only has
negative beneﬁts from this addition. Hence, in a network requiring consent this link
will never be added.
Strict link addition proofness requires that for every pair of non-linked players,
both of these players have non-positive beneﬁts from adding a link between them,
i.e., it imposes that neither player has strictly positive incentives to add a link. This
formulation does not explicitly introduce a consent requirement; it simply imposes
that additional links do not lead to additional revenues. Since both players involved
with the formation of an additional link perceive that they individually reduce their
payoffs by forming the link, this is a signiﬁcant strengthening of the link addition
proofness requirement. Strict link addition proofness has been introduced in Gilles
and Sarangi (2005a) and is further analyzed in Gilles and Sarangi (2005b).
The simplest notion combining both addition and deletion proofness was seminally
introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) through the concept of pairwise stability.
8Given that these two conditions can be strengthened in various ways it is also possible
to deﬁne a variety of modiﬁcations of the pairwise stability concept:
Deﬁnition 2.2 Let ϕ be a network payoff function on the player set N.
(a) A network g ∈ GN is pairwise stable for ϕ if g is link deletion proof as well as
link addition proof.
Denote by P(ϕ) = D(ϕ) ∩ A(ϕ) ⊂ GN the family of pairwise stable networks
for the payoff function ϕ.
(b) A network g ∈ GN is strongly pairwise stable for ϕ if g is strong link deletion
proof as well as link addition proof.
Denote by Ps(ϕ) = Ds(ϕ) ∩ A(ϕ) ⊂ GN the family of pairwise stable networks
for the payoff function ϕ.
(c) A network g ∈ GN is strictly pairwise stable for ϕ if g is strong link deletion
proof as well as strict link addition proof.
Denote by P?(ϕ) = Ds(ϕ) ∩ As(ϕ) ⊂ GN the family of strict pairwise stable
networks for the payoff function ϕ.
We refer to Gilles and Sarangi (2005b) for the discussion of equivalence between
these three classes of networks. There it is shown that under a convexity property as
well as a sign uniformity condition on the network payoff function, all three classes of
networks are equal. Gilles and Sarangi (2005a) show in fact that a large sub-family of
the class of strictly pairwise stable networks is supported through a learning process
based on a myopic belief system. This gives a powerful support to this particular class
of networks.
2.5 Myerson’s Consent Game
Myerson (1991, page 448) seminally introduced a model of consent in link formation.
This model received relatively little serious attention in the literature on network
formation until recently. The reason is that the family of Nash equilibria of Myerson’s
game is very large.3
The model introduced by Myerson (1991) is deﬁned as a normal form non-
cooperative game and throughout this paper denoted as the Consent Game. To deﬁne
3For a complete characterization of the Nash equilibria in Myerson’s consent game we refer to Gilles,
Chakrabarti, and Sarangi (2005a). For further discussion we also refer to Jackson (2003) and Jackson
(2005b).
9this Consent Game, let ϕ: GN → RN be some network payoff function. Now consider
for every player i ∈ N the strategy set given by
Ai = {(lij)j6=i | lij ∈ {0,1}}.
Here we interpret lij = 1 to be a signal from player i to player j that she wants to
form a link with j. Here, lij = 0 means that player i does not want to form such a
link with player j.
A link is formed if both i and j want to form links, namely if lij · lji = 1. The
resulting network is given by
g(l) = {ij ∈ gN | lij · lji = 1}.
We say that the network g(l) is supported through the strategy proﬁle l. The game-
theoretic payoff function is now given by πϕ = (πϕ,i)i∈N: A → RN where πϕ,i(l) =
ϕi(g(l)). We denote the Consent Game corresponding to the network payoff function
ϕ now by Γϕ = (A,πϕ).
Note that every strategy proﬁle supports an unique network, but that a network may
be supported through multiple strategy proﬁles. We denote the set of all strategy
proﬁles supporting a network g by Ag ≡ {l ∈ A | g(l) = g} ⊂ A.
Each network g ⊂ gN is however supported through a unique non-superﬂuous
strategy proﬁle ig ∈ Ag satisfying the requirement that for all pairs i,j ∈ N: lij = 1
implies that lji = 1.
3 Exact Network Potentials
First we deﬁne exact network potentials and provide a characterization of network
payoff functions that admit such potentials. We also relate these potentials to the
exact potentials of the Consent Game. We introduce some required concepts and
subsequently show the relationship between these. We begin by deﬁning the notion
of Equal Bargaining Power,4 introduced by Myerson (1977) and further developed by
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Jackson (2005a).
Deﬁnition 3.1 Let ϕ: GN → RN be a network payoff function.
(a) The network payoff function ϕ is said to satisfy the equal bargaining power
property if for all g and for all i,j ∈ N with ij ∈ g,
ϕi(g) − ϕi(g − ij) = ϕj(g) − ϕj(g − ij).
4This terminology follows Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
10(b) The network payoff function ϕ admits an exact network potential if ϕ satisﬁes
the equal bargaining power property and there exists a function ω: GN → R such
that for all g ∈ GN and ij ∈ g,
ω(g) − ω(g − ij) = ϕi(g) − ϕi(g − ij) = ϕj(g) − ϕj(g − ij) (6)
The notion of an exact network potential is closely related to that of a game theoretic
exact potential. Note, however, that these network potentials are only deﬁned on the
class of network payoff functions satisfying Equal Bargaining Power.
Next we deﬁne an equivalent condition on network payoff functions. Consider
any network payoff function ϕ satisfying Equal Bargaining Power. Then we deﬁne
the function θϕ: GN × gN → R by
θϕ(g,ij) = ϕi(g) − ϕi(g − ij) = ϕj(g) − ϕj(g − ij)
for all ij ∈ g.
Consider any arbitrary network g ∈ GN. Let g consist of k links where obviously
k 6 1
2n(n − 1). Next, we label the links in the network g to order them. Let this













m, m = 1,2,...,k, is some link ij ∈ g between two players i,j ∈ N. This
introduces an order or permutation ρ: g  g on the network g. There exist a total of
k! such orders on g and we denote the set of all these orders by Xg.
Given an order ρ ∈ Xg, we can construct a sequence of adjacent networks that
satisfy the following conditions:
g
ρ





m for all m = 1,...,k.
Note that from this it immediately follows that g
ρ
k = g for any order ρ ∈ Xg.
On g, the ﬁrst and the last network of the constructed sequence of adjacent net-
works are the same. Hence, the given sequence represents the network formation
process leading to g starting from the empty network and adding links one at a time
according to the order. Then, for any network payoff function ϕ that satisﬁes Equal







for all g ∈ GN, ρ ∈ Xg. We can now deﬁne the required Sums Property as follows.
11Deﬁnition 3.2 A network payoff function ϕ satisﬁes the Sums Property if ϕ satisﬁes
Equal Bargaining Power and if for all g ∈ GN,
Sϕ(g,ρ1) = Sϕ(g,ρ2) (7)
for any two arbitrary orders ρ1,ρ2 ∈ Xg.
Our main equivalence theorem for exact network potentials is stated below and pro-
vides a complete characterization of the existence of exact network potentials in
terms of the Consent Game as well as the Sums Property.
Theorem 3.3 The following statements are equivalent for an arbitrary network payoff
function ϕ on GN.
(i) The network payoff function ϕ admits an exact network potential.
(ii) The Consent Game Γϕ admits an exact potential.
(iii) The network payoff function ϕ satisﬁes the Sums Property.
The proof of Theorem 3.3 is relegated to the appendix.
The following example illustrates a familiar case that satisﬁes the properties of
Theorem 3.3. Throughout we use the terminology from Gilles, Chakrabarti, and
Sarangi (2005b).
Example 3.4 Link-based network payoff functions refer to linear network payoff
functions that are devoid of network externalities. Beneﬁts accrue only from direct
links and each link yields a ﬁxed beneﬁt or loss independent of network structure.
This has been explored by Baron, Durieu, Haller, and Solal (2006) in a slightly more
general context. For further details we also refer to Gilles, Chakrabarti, and Sarangi
(2005b).
Let ξi: Li → R be the link beneﬁt function for player i ∈ N which assigns to each
potential link ij ∈ Li a payoff ξi(ij) ∈ R. Based on this link-based payoff function
one can deﬁne a network payoff function ϕξ where ϕξ,i(g) =
P
j∈Ni(g) ξi(ij). If for
all ij ∈ gN, it holds that ξi(ij) = ξj(ij) = ξ(ij), then the network payoff function is
referred to as a mutual link-based network payoff function.
Such mutual link-based payoff functions admit an exact network potential. An exact





The case that ϕξ is not a mutual link-based network payoff function does not admit
an exact network potential. For further discussion we refer to Example 4.2. 
12Next we elaborate on the relationship between network payoff functions admitting
exact network potentials and the Shapley value of a constructed cooperative game.
Similar relationships have been explored by Monderer and Shapley (1996), Qin
(1996), and Ui (2000). Given ϕ: GN → RN, we introduce for every network g ∈ GN





where g|S = {ij ∈ g | i ∈ S and j ∈ S}. In other words, the characteristic function is
such that the value generated by a coalition is the sum of the payoffs of all members
of the coalition for the sub-network in which all links for which one or both members
pertaining to any link are outside the coalition is removed. The Shapley value of this
cooperative game is denoted by φ(Uϕ,g) = {φi(Uϕ,g)}i∈N.
Deﬁnition 3.5 The network payoff function ϕ is Shapley-consistent if for every g ∈
GN it holds that ϕ(g) = φ(Uϕ,g).
In other words, if payoffs were redistributed according to the Shapley value, the
payoffs would not change. Subsequently we introduce a class of network payoff
functions where if a player is an unconnected singleton, she earns the same payoff
irrespective of network structure.
Deﬁnition 3.6 We deﬁne e Φ to be the family of network payoff functions ϕ: GN → RN
such that for every player i ∈ N, there exists some τi ∈ R such that for every network
g ∈ GN with i ∈ N0(g) it holds that ϕi(g) = τi.
The class e Φ includes all network payoff functions that do not display widespread
externalities beyond the connected players N(g) ⊂ N. Namely, every player i ∈
N0(g) = N\N(g) receives exactly the same payoff irrespective of the structure of the
connected part of the network g.
The next result extends the insights presented in Qin (1996) and Ui (2000) for
the setting of networks with widespread externalities. For a proof of this theorem we
again refer to the appendix.
Theorem 3.7 The two following statements hold for any network payoff function ϕ.
(a) If ϕ is Shapley-consistent, then ϕ admits an exact network potential.
(b) If ϕ ∈ e Φ admits an exact network potential, then ϕ is Shapley-consistent.
13We remark that Theorem 3.7 is similar to the main result of Qin (1996). Qin proved
his result for so-called cooperation structures deﬁned as cooperative games in which
only connected groups of players within a communication network can form coali-
tions.5 Our result extends Qin’s insights to the setting of social networks in the pres-
ence of widespread externalities to communication and cooperation.
If ϕ / ∈ e Φ, then the converse of Theorem 3.7(a) does not hold. Below, we discuss
a simple counter-example.
Example 3.8 Let n = 3 and consider the network payoff function given in the fol-
lowing table:
Network ϕ1(g) ϕ2(g) ϕ3(g)
g0 = ∅ 0 0 0
g1 = {12} 1 1 2
g2 = {13} 1 0 1
g3 = {23} 0 1 1
g4 = {12,13} 3 2 4
g5 = {12,23} 2 3 4
g6 = {13,23} 2 2 3
g7 = gN 5 5 7
From the table one can deduce that ϕ / ∈ e Φ. Indeed, player 3 receives ϕ3(g1) = 2 6=
0 = ϕ3(g0) even though 3 ∈ N0(g1).
The reader can verify that the Sums Property is satisﬁed. For every network g we
may compute the Sums function Sϕ(g), which is independent of the selected order
on g, and remark that Sϕ is in fact an exact network potential for this network payoff
function. (This is shown formally in the proof of Theorem 3.3.)
Sϕ(g0) = 0
Sϕ({12}) = Sϕ({13}) = Sϕ({23}) = 1
Sϕ({12,13}) = Sϕ({12,23}) = Sϕ({13,23}) = 3
Sϕ({12,13,23}) = 6
In fact a reinterpretation of this particular network payoff function ϕ is that it is a
simple construction direct from the network potential Sϕ except for the anomalous
value of ϕ3(g1).
5The notion of such a communication requirement on coalition formation was seminally introduced
by Myerson (1977). We remark here that in this approach the network does not generate externalities,
but acts as a limiting device on the cooperative possibilities.
14Now one can verify that for the network g1 the constructed cooperative game U =
Uϕ,g1 is given by
U(∅) = U(1) = U(2) = U(3) = 0
U(12) = 2
U(13) = U(23) = 0
U(123) = 4
This cooperative game has a Shapley value given by φ(U) = (12
3,12
3, 2
3) 6= (1,1,2) =
ϕ(g1). Thus, this payoff function—although admitting an exact network potential—
does not satisfy Shapley consistency. 
4 Ordinal Network Potentials
We proceed to discuss ordinal network potentials and explore their relationship with
ordinal potentials of the corresponding Consent Game. Ordinal network potentials
generalize the notion of an exact network potential from cardinal structures to or-
dinal structures similarly as seminally introduced by Monderer and Shapley (1996).
We subsequently examine the properties of network payoff functions admitting such
ordinal network potentials.
Like we did for the case of exact network potentials, we are only able to introduce
the notion of an ordinal network potential for a class of network payoff functions
that satisﬁes the so-called pairwise sign compatibility condition, which generalizes
the equal bargaining power requirement.
Deﬁnition 4.1 Let ϕ: GN → RN be a network payoff function.
(a) ϕ is said to satisfy pairwise sign compatibility (PSC) if for all g and ij ∈ g, the
following three properties hold:
ϕi(g) > ϕi(g − ij) =⇒ ϕj(g) > ϕj(g − ij);
ϕi(g) < ϕi(g − ij) =⇒ ϕj(g) < ϕj(g − ij);
ϕi(g) = ϕi(g − ij) =⇒ ϕj(g) = ϕj(g − ij).
(b) ϕ admits an ordinal network potential if ϕ satisﬁes pairwise sign compatibil-
ity and there exists a function ω: GN → R such that for all g and ij ∈ g,
ω(g) > ω(g − ij) ⇐⇒ ϕi(g) > ϕi(g − ij); (8)
ω(g) < ω(g − ij) ⇐⇒ ϕi(g) < ϕi(g − ij); (9)
ω(g) = ω(g − ij) ⇐⇒ ϕi(g) = ϕi(g − ij). (10)
15We introduce a short-hand notation for denoting the above, namely, (8), (9) and (10)
are equivalent to Sign(ω(g),ω(g − ij)) = Sign(ϕi(g),ϕi(g − ij)).
To illustrate the introduction of the concept of an ordinal network potential we
return to the case of link-based network payoffs already discussed in Example 3.4.
The following illustrates when ordinal network potentials can be admitted for that
particular case.
Example 4.2 Let N be van arbitrary player set. As in Example 3.4 consider for each
player i ∈ N a link-based payoff function ξi: Li → R. Again we deﬁne the network
payoff function by ϕξ,i(g) =
P
ij∈Li(g) ξi(ij).
If for all i,j ∈ N it holds that ξi(ij) > 0 implies ξj(ij) > 0 as well as ξi(ij) < 0 implies
ξj(ij) < 0, then ϕξ satisﬁes PSC and even admits an ordinal network potential. In








It is easy to see that this ordinal network potential generalizes the formulated exact
network potential function introduced in Example 3.4. 
The following theorem is the analogue of Theorem 3.3 for the ordinal case. However,
only a partial relationship can be developed for the ordinal case. A proof of this
theorem can be found in the appendix.
Theorem 4.3 Let ϕ be some network payoff function. If the corresponding Consent
Game Γϕ admits an ordinal potential, then ϕ admits an ordinal network potential.
The existence of an ordinal network potential is a strictly weaker property than the
property that the corresponding Consent Game admits an ordinal potential. The
following example shows this. The network payoff function below admits an ordinal
network potential but the corresponding Consent Game does not admit an ordinal
potential. In fact, it violates the ﬁnite improvement property of Monderer and Shapley
(1996) which is a necessary condition for a non-cooperative game to admit an ordinal
potential.6
Example 4.4 Let n = 3 and consider the following network payoff function.
6We omit a discussion of the ﬁnite improvement property since it involves concepts that are unrelated
to rest of the paper. For details we refer to Monderer and Shapley (1996).
16Network ϕ1(g) ϕ2(g) ϕ3(g)
g0 = ∅ 0 0 0
g1 = {12} -5 -5 -2
g2 = {13} -2 0 -2
g3 = {23} -1 -1 -1
g4 = {12,13} 1 -4 -1
g5 = {12,23} -2 -3 0
g6 = {13,23} 1 1 0
g7 = gN 5 5 5









It can also be derived for the given network payoff function ϕ that the ﬁnite improve-
ment property (Monderer and Shapley 1996) is not satisﬁed for the corresponding
Consent Game Γϕ. Indeed, we device the following four strategy tuples7 in A:
l1 = (00,11,10) with g(l1) = g0 = ∅
l2 = (11,11,10) with g(l2) = g4 = {12,13}
l3 = (11,11,01) with g(l3) = g5 = {12,23}
l4 = (00,11,01) with g(l4) = g3 = {23}
We claim that l1 − l2 − l3 − l4 − l1 is an improvement cycle in the sense of Monderer
and Shapley (1996). Indeed, Player 1 increases his individual payoff π1 by moving
from l1 (g0) to l2 (g4) and from l3 (g5) to l4 (g3). Also, Player 3 increases his indi-
vidual payoff π3 by moving from l2 (g4) to l3 (g5) and from l4 (g3) to l1 (g0). This
shows that indeed the network payoff function ϕ generates a Consent Game Γϕ that
does not satisfy the ﬁnite improvement property and, therefore, does not admit an
7In this example we use shorthand notation for these strategy tuples. We use the listing convention
given by l = (l12 l13,l21 l23,l31 l32).
17ordinal potential.
The underlying motive is mainly that non-cooperative game theoretic improvement
paths are very different in nature from link-based improvement paths as introduced
in the next section. Indeed, individual players are completely in control of the strate-
gies that they select. This is fundamentally different from the coordinated strategic
modiﬁcation underlying a link-based improvement. 
In the next section we discuss several properties of network payoff function which ad-
mit ordinal network potentials and those for which the corresponding Consent Game
admits an ordinal potential. We introduce the following three classes of network
payoff functions:
Φ1: This is the set of network payoff functions ϕ that admit an exact network po-
tential. This is equivalent to the requirement that the corresponding Consent
Game Γϕ admits an exact potential.
Φ2: This is the set of network payoff functions ϕ for which the corresponding Con-
sent Game Γϕ admits an ordinal potential.
Φ3: This is the set of network payoff functions ϕ that admit an ordinal network
potential.
From the above deﬁnitions, it can be concluded that
∅ 6= Φ1   Φ2   Φ3.
We emphasize that in principle there is no link of the sets introduced above with the
collection e Φ introduced in the preceding section of this paper.
5 Potentials and network stability
In this section we discuss the relationship between the existence of an ordinal net-
work potential and the convergence of improvement paths to a pairwise stable net-
work in the sense of Jackson and Watts (2002a). Subsequently we consider simi-
lar questions with regard to network payoff functions in the class Φ2 for which the
corresponding Consent Game admits an ordinal potential. We show that these pay-
off functions imply stronger convergence and existence properties. (Jackson and
Watts 2001)
185.1 Improvement processes
We ﬁrst introduce some concepts taken from Jackson and Watts (2002a) and Jackson
and Watts (2002b).8
Deﬁnition 5.1 An improvement path from a network g to a network g0 is a ﬁnite
sequence of adjacent networks g1,g2,...,gK with g1 = g and gK = g0 such that for any
k ∈ {1,...,K − 1} either
(i) gk+1 = gk − ij for some ij such that ϕi(gk − ij) > ϕi(gk), or
(ii) gk+1 = gk + ij for some ij such that ϕi(gk + ij) > ϕi(gk) and ϕj(gk + ij) >
ϕj(gk).
An improvement path C ⊂ GN is an improvement cycle if for any g ∈ C and g0 ∈ C
there exists an improvement path from g to g0.
If there is an improvement path from g to g0 and g and g0 are adjacent, then we also say
that g0 defeats g. It should be clear that every pairwise stable network is undefeated.
It is obvious that if there are no improvement cycles, then the network payoff function
admits a pairwise stable network. This is because in general there are three possibil-
ities. First, there are no improvement paths, in which case every network is pairwise
stable. Second, every improvement path terminates in some pairwise stable network.
Third, there is at least one improvement path that does not terminate. Given that
there are only a ﬁnite number of networks, the latter simply means there exists an
improvement cycle. Therefore, the absence of improvement cycles guarantees exis-
tence of at least one pairwise stable network. We formalize this using the following
insight, which forms the foundation of the research on pairwise stable networks of
Jackson and Watts (2002a) and Jackson and Watts (2001).
Lemma 5.2 : Corollary to Jackson and Watts (2001, Lemma 1).
Given any network payoff function, there either exists at least one improvement cycle or
at least one pairwise stable network.
In fact, Jackson and Watts (2001) prove a much stronger result, namely that there
exists at least one closed improvement cycle or at least one pairwise stable network,
a closed improvement cycle being an improvement cycle such that there are no al-
ternative improvement paths emanating from any of the networks that are part of
8The terminology of an “improvement path” introduced here should be distinguished strictly from
the concept with the same name in non-cooperative game theory. The notion developed here refers
to a sequence of networks with certain properties rather than a sequence of strategy tuples as used in
non-cooperative game theory.
19the improvement cycle. Jackson and Watts (2001) have also deﬁned necessary and
sufﬁcient conditions for absence of improvement cycles.
Next we turn to the discussion of the relationship between improvement paths
and the presence of ordinal network potentials.
Theorem 5.3 If ϕ ∈ Φ3 admits an ordinal network potential, then the following prop-
erties hold:
(a) There exists at least one pairwise stable network;
(b) There are no improvement cycles;
(c) The set of strongly pairwise stable and strictly pairwise stable networks coincide.
For a proof of Theorem 5.3 we refer to the appendix.
The converse of assertion 5.3(b) is not true. There can be payoff functions without
improvement cycles, but for which there does not exist an ordinal network potential.
The next counter-example is a modiﬁcation of an example developed in Jackson and
Watts (2001).
Example 5.4 Let n = 3. Suppose the network payoff function is such that {12,23,13}
defeats {12,23} defeats {12} defeats {12,13}, but that players 2 and 3 are both indif-
ferent between {12,23,13} and {12,13}. Suppose also no other network defeats any
other. Here the reader can verify that there are no improvement cycles. But we can
show that no ordinal network potential exists.
Suppose by contradiction that an ordinal network potential, say ω, exists. Then, by





Hence, ω({12,23,13}) > ω({12,13}). But the fact that 2 and 3 are both indifferent
between {12,23,13} and {12,13} implies
ω({12,23,13}) = ω({12,13})
which is a contradiction. 
20Next, we show that two additional conditions, Pairwise Sign Compatibility and a “no
indifference” condition guarantee the existence of ordinal network potential. In the
above case, no indifference is violated. The used terminology follows Jackson and
Watts (2001).
The network payoff function exhibits no indifference if for any two adjacent net-
works g and g0, either g defeats g0 or g0 defeats g.
We can now establish the sufﬁcient conditions for existence of ordinal network
potentials. For a proof of the next theorem we refer as usual to the appendix.
Theorem 5.5 If the network payoff function satisﬁes Pairwise Sign Compatibility, ex-
hibits no indifference, and is such that there are no improvement cycles, then the network
payoff function admits an ordinal network potential and hence belongs to Φ3.
5.2 Existence of strictly pairwise stable networks
Next we address the implications of the existence of potentials for the existence of
pairwise stable networks. As Jackson and Watts (2001) show, improvement paths in
general converge to pairwise stable networks. Hence, if convergence can be estab-
lished, the existence of such networks is guaranteed as well. This is closely related to
the presence of potential functions as originally pointed out by Jackson and Watts.
Here we generalize the ﬁndings of Jackson and Watts. In particular, we are able to
show that for the subclass Φ2 of network payoff functions for which the correspond-
ing Consent Game has an ordinal potential, we can guarantee the existence of strictly
pairwise stable networks. This rather strong existence result implies, therefore, the
existence of strongly pairwise stable as well as regular pairwise stable networks.
Theorem 5.6 If ϕ ∈ Φ2, then there exists at least one strictly pairwise stable network.
The proof of Theorem 5.6 is based on the fact that, given that there are a ﬁnite
number of strategy tuples in the corresponding Consent Game, for any ϕ ∈ Φ2 there
exists an ordinal potential maximizer. This potential maximizer corresponds to a
strictly pairwise stable network.
This raises the question whether every strictly or strongly pairwise stable net-
work is supported through a potential maximizer of the Consent game. The next
counterexample shows this is not the case.
Example 5.7 Let n = 3 and consider the network payoff function be given by
ϕk(g) = 1 for all k ∈ N if g = {ij,ih} has a line topology, and
ϕi(g) = 0 for all i ∈ N and for all other g ∈ GN.
21This network payoff function admits an exact network potential, i.e., ϕ ∈ Φ1 and,
hence, ϕ ∈ Φ2.9 Now consider the empty network g0. It is strongly pairwise stable,
and, consequently, strictly pairwise stable as well. Indeed, there are no links to be
deleted and addition of any one link will not change payoffs.
Next, we show that a strategy tuple supporting g0 is not necessarily a potential max-
imizer. First, consider the strategy tuple l given by l = (00,10,10). It supports the
empty network. But it is not an ordinal potential maximizer. Let Q be an arbitrary
ordinal potential of the corresponding Consent Game (A,π). Then, deﬁneb l1 ∈ A1 to
be such thatb l12 =b l13 = 1, then
π1(b l1,l−1) = 1 > 0 = π1(l) ⇒ Q(b l1,l−1) > Q(l)
and hence l is not an ordinal potential maximizer. In fact, we can extend this reason-
ing and show that none of the strategy tuples supporting the empty network g0 are
ordinal potential maximizers. 
6 Some applications
In this section we discuss several applications of the theory of network potentials
developed in the previous sections. First we turn shortly to a well-known applica-
tion from social network theory, the so-called connections model, due to Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996).
Subsequently we turn to the discussion of the introduction of costs in the link for-
mation process. (Gilles, Chakrabarti, and Sarangi 2005a) If link formation is costly,
we show that essentially the main implication of the presence of network potentials is
not affected. Under both two-sided and one-sided link formation costs, the presence
of a network potential implies that the Consent Game admits a potential as well. It
should be clear that the reverse of this implication can no longer be guaranteed as is
the case for costless link formation.
6.1 The connections model
We illustrate Theorem 4.3 with an application that illustrates the applicability of ordi-
nal network potentials to models considered in the literature. The connections model
describes that communication over multiple links reduces the resulting beneﬁts ex-
ponentially. Besides social applications, the connections model has application in
9In fact, an exact network potential function ω for ϕ is given by ω(g) = 1 for g = {ij,ik} with a line
topology and ω(g) = 0 for all other g ∈ G
N.
22engineering, in particular wireless mobile ad-hoc networks. (Srivastava, Neel, Hicks,
MacKenzie, Lau, DaSilva, Reed, and Gilles 2005)
Let the player set N be arbitrary and consider any g ∈ GN. The connections









where 0 < δ < 1, cij > 0 is the cost of establishing link ij for player i, and tij(g) is
the number of links on the shortest path between i and j. The number tij(g) is also
called the “geodesic distance” between i and j in network g. (If i and j are not linked,
i.e., ij / ∈ g, then tij(g) = ∞ by convention.) If for the connections model given in
(11) it holds that all link formation costs are equal, i.e., cij = c > 0, then we refer to
this setup as the symmetric connections model.
In the symmetric connections model, if c < δ − δ2, then ϕδ admits an ordinal
network potential. In that case, any link formed increases the payoffs of both players




i(g) is an ordinal network potential.
6.2 Two-sided link formation costs
Let N = {1,...,n} be a given set of players and ψ: GN → RN
+ be a ﬁxed, but arbitrary
network beneﬁt function representing the gross beneﬁts that accrue to the players in
a network.10 For every player i ∈ N we introduce individualized link formation costs
represented by ci = (cij)j6=i ∈ R
N\{i}
+ . (Note that for some links ij ∈ gN it might hold
that cij 6= cji.) Thus, the pair hψ,ci represents the basic payoffs and costs of network
formation to the individuals in N.
As in the standard Consent Game we let for every player i ∈ N her action set be
given by
Ai = {(lij)j6=i | lij ∈ {0,1}}
As before, player i seeks contact with player j if lij = 1 and a link is formed if both
players seek contact, i.e., lij = lji = 1.
Let A =
Q
i∈N Ai where l ∈ A. Then the resulting network is given by
g(l) = {ij ∈ gN | lij = lji = 1}.
10We emphasize that a network beneﬁt function is simply a network payoff function that only admits
non-negative payoffs to the players.
23Now, however, link formation is costly. Approaching player j to form a link costs
player i an amount cij > 0. This results in the following game theoretic payoff
function for player i:
πa
i (l) = ψi(ga(l)) −
X
j6=i
lij · cij (12)
where c is the link formation cost introduced above.
The pair hψ,ci thus generates the non-cooperative game Γ2(ψ,c) = (A,πa) as
described above. The game Γ2(ψ,c) is denoted as the Consent Game under two-sided
link formation costs.
Proposition 6.1 Consider the Consent Game under two-sided link formation costs Γ2(ψ,c)
based on hψ,ci. If ψ ∈ Φ1 is a network beneﬁt function that admits an exact network
potential, then the Consent Game under two-sided link formation costs admits an exact
potential.
Proof. Let ψ admit an exact potential ω: GN → R. Now consider the function
Qa: A → R given by
Qa(l) = ω(g(l)) −
X
ij∈gN
[lij · cij + lji · cji ]
Using similar arguments as used in the proof of theorem 3.3, we now can show that
the function Qa is in fact an exact potential for the Consent Game under two-sided
link formation costs (A,πa).
The assertion of Proposition 6.1 is not true for ordinal network potentials. Indeed
consider the following situation. Let there be three players (n = 3) and the network
beneﬁts function ψ given in the matrix below. We remark that the network beneﬁts
function ψ admits an ordinal network potential given by ω, also provided in this
matrix.
Network ψ1(g) ψ2(g) ψ3(g) ω(g)
g0 = ∅ 0 0 0 1
g1 = {12} 5 6 7 3
g2 = {13} 8 9 10 5
g3 = {23} 11 12 13 7
g4 = {12,13} 13.5 14 14.5 9
g5 = {12,23} 15 15.5 16 11
g6 = {13,23} 16.5 17 18 13
g7 = gN 20 29 30 15
24Next consider costly network formation such that c12 = 4, c31 = 6, c23 = 13, and
cij = 0 for all other ordered pairs ij / ∈ {12,31,23}.
Within the provided setting we can now construct an improvement cycle in the
consent game under two-sided link formation costs Γ2(ψ,c), thus showing that the
impossibility that this game admits an ordinal potential. This improvement cycle is
as follows:
l1 = (11,11,11) with g(l1) = g7 = gN
l2 = (01,11,11) with g(l2) = g5
l3 = (01,11,01) with g(l3) = g3
l4 = (01,10,01) with g(l4) = g0 = ∅
l5 = (11,10,01) with g(l5) = g1
l6 = (11,10,11) with g(l6) = g4
It is easy to see that this strategy sequence indeed constitutes an improvement cycle
in Γ2(ψ,c).
This shows the claim that even though the network beneﬁt function ψ admits an
ordinal potential, the resulting consent game under two-sided link formation costs
does not necessarily have to admit an ordinal potential.
6.3 One-sided link formation costs
In this section we discuss the Consent Game under one-sided link formation costs.
Here links are formed by mutual agreement, but only one player in the pair under
consideration initiates the link formation process and the other player only responds
to this link formation attempt. The initiator incurs the formation costs of the link,
while the respondent incurs no costs. Our discussion follows the setup developed in
Gilles, Chakrabarti, and Sarangi (2005a).11 Hence, a different strategy space reﬂect-
ing the difference between initiator and respondent is called for.
Formally, consider an arbitrary player set N and a non-negative network beneﬁt
function ψ: GN → RN
+. To model the separation of the initiation of links and the re-
sponding to link formation initiations, we introduce for every player i ∈ N a strategy
set given by
Ab
i = {(lij,rij)j6=i | lij,rij ∈ {0,1}}. (13)
11We remark that a similar link formation structure has been already discussed by Slikker (2000) and
Slikker, Gilles, Norde, and Tijs (2005) in the context of the formation of directed networks. See also
Dutta and Jackson (2000).
25Player i acts as the initiator in forming a link with player j if lij = 1. Player j responds
positively to this initiative if rji = 1. A link is established if formation is initiated and




i be the corresponding strategy tuple space. Given the link
formation procedure described, for any (l,r) ∈ Ab, the resulting network is now
given by
gb(l,r) = {ij ∈ gN | lij = rji = 1}. (14)
When player i initiates the formation of a link with player j she incurs a cost of
cij > 0. Responding to the initiative by another player, however, is costless. This
results in the following game theoretic payoff function for player i:
πb
i (l,r) = ϕi(gb(l,r)) −
X
j6=i
lij · cij (15)
where c denotes the link formation costs.
Analogous to the previous model with two-sided link formation costs, the pair
hψ,ci now generates the non-cooperative game Γ1(ψ,c) = (Ab,πb) introduced above.
The game Γ1(ψ,c) represents the Consent Game under one-sided link formation costs.
The next proposition shows only a partial statement of the similar proposition
formulated for the Consent Game under two-sided link formation costs. The structure
of one-sided link formation costs is based on a fundamental asymmetry that can no
longer be linked directly to standard Consent Game Γψ based on the beneﬁt function
ψ admitting an ordinal potential.
Proposition 6.2 Let Γ1(ψ,c) be the Consent Game under one-sided link formation costs
based on hψ,ci. If ψ ∈ Φ1 admits an exact network potential, then the Consent Game
under one-sided link formation costs Γ1(ψ,c) admits an exact potential.
Proof. Let ψ ∈ Φ1 admit an exact potential ω: GN → R. Now consider the function
Qb: Ab → R given by
Qb(l,r) = ω(gb(l,r)) −
X
ij∈gN
[lij · cij + lji · cji ]
Again using similar techniques as used in the proof of Theorem 3.3 we can now
show that the function Qb is in fact an exact potential for the Consent Game under
one-sided link formation costs Γ1(ψ,c).
267 Coda
While potentials are deﬁned for non-cooperative games, a similar notion called net-
work potentials can be deﬁned for network payoff functions. It is closely related
to the potentials of a non-cooperative link formation game due to Myerson (1991).
An exact network potential exists if and only if the Consent Game admits an exact
potential. The existence of network ordinal potentials is however weaker than the
existence of ordinal potentials for the Consent Game. When these potentials exist,
the network payoff function has attractive properties. When exact network potentials
exist, there exists both a strongly pairwise stable and a strictly pairwise stable net-
work. Under the much weaker condition of the existence of ordinal potentials, there
are no network improvement cycles, at least one pairwise stable network exists and
the set of strongly pairwise stable and strictly pairwise stable networks coincide.
Topics for further research include when does existence of ordinal network po-
tentials guarantee that the Consent Game has an ordinal potential. Another topic
of interest is what are the interesting examples of network payoff functions satisfy
the somewhat demanding conditions of the existence of exact and ordinal network
payoff functions. Gilles, Chakrabarti, and Sarangi (2005b) discuss an example of
network payoff function for which an exact network potential exists.
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29Appendix: Proofs of the main results
Proof of Theorem 3.3
We begin by showing that Equal Bargaining Power is necessary for a potential to
exist. We shall use it in the subsequent proof of Theorem 3.3.
Claim 1 Let ϕ be some network payoff function. If the Consent Game Γϕ corresponding
to ϕ admits an exact potential, then ϕ satisﬁes Equal Bargaining Power.
Proof. Let ϕ be a network payoff function such the the corresponding Consent game
Γϕ admits an exact potential. Speciﬁcally, let Q : A → RN be that exact potential.
Now, assume to the contrary that ϕ does not satisfy the Equal Bargaining Power
property. Then there exists a network b g and a link ij ∈ b g such that
ϕi(b g) − ϕi(b g − ij) 6= ϕj(b g) − ϕj(b g − ij). (16)
Consider the non-superﬂuous strategy proﬁle b l that supports b g. Further, let e l be the
non-superﬂuous strategy proﬁle supporting b g − ij. Then,
e lij =e lji = 0;
^ lij = ^ lji = 1;
e lik =b lik for k 6= i;
e ljk =b ljk for k 6= j;
e lkm =b lkm for k,m / ∈ {i,j}.
Now,
πi(b l) − πi(e li,b l−i) = ϕi(b g) − ϕi(b g − ij) = Q(b l) − Q(e li,b l−i). (17)
Also,
πj(b l) − πj(e lj,b l−j) = ϕj(b g) − ϕj(b g − ij) = Q(b l) − Q(e lj,b l−j). (18)
From (16), (17) and (18), it now follows that
Q(e li,b l−i) 6= Q(e lj,b l−j). (19)
On the other hand, note that
(e li,e lj,b l−i,j) =e l
and that
g(e li,b l−i) = g(e lj,b l−j) = g(e li,e lj,b l−i,j) = g(e l) = b g − ij.
Therefore,
πi(e lj,b l−j) = πi(e li,e lj,b l−i,j) = ϕi(b g − ij);
πj(e li,b l−i) = πj(e li,e lj,b l−i,j) = ϕj(b g − ij),
30and
πi(e lj,b l−j) − πi(e li,e lj,b l−i,j) = 0;
πj(e li,b l−i) − πj(e li,e lj,b l−i,j) = 0,
which implies
Q(e lj,b l−j) − Q(e li,e lj,b l−i,j) = 0;
Q(e li,b l−i) − Q(e li,e lj,b l−i,j) = 0.
Thus, we conclude that
Q(e lj,b l−j) = Q(e li,b l−i) = Q(e li,e lj,b l−i,j). (20)
But (20) contradicts (19). Hence, we have shown the assertion.
With the proven claim we are able to construct a proof of Theorem 3.3.
(i) implies (ii)
Suppose there exists an exact network potential for ϕ. Let ω: GN → R denote
this exact network potential. We now show that an exact potential exists for the
corresponding the Consent Game Γϕ.
Consider any arbitrary action-tuple l = (li)i∈N. Let g(l) = g (say).
Let i ∈ N. Now, Ni(g), as deﬁned, is the set of players in i’s neighborhood. Let
Mi(g) = {j ∈ N\Ni(g) | lji = 1}. Now, by deviating from l, i can form links with
any member of the set Mi(g) and can delete links with any member of the set Ni(g).
Hence, consider any arbitrary strategyb li 6= li. Let
b Ni(g) = {j ∈ Ni(g) |b lij = 0};
c Mi(g) = {j ∈ Mi(g) |b lij = 1}.
Then,
g(b li,l−i) = g +





{i} × c Mi(g)

(21)
Let # b Ni(g) = k and #c Mi(g) = m where k,m ∈ N. Label the players such that
{i1,i2,...,ik} = b Ni(g) and {ik+1,ik+2,...,ik+m} = c Mi(g). Next construct a sequence
of adjacent networks as follows:
g1 = g − ii1;
g2 = g1 − ii2;
. . .
gk = gk−1 − iik;
gk+1 = gk + iik+1;
gk+2 = gk+1 + iik+2;
. . .
gk+m = gk+m−1 + iik+m.
31From (21), it then follows that
gk+m = g(b li,l−i). (22)
Now, from (6), it follows that
ω(g) − ω(g1) = ϕi(g) − ϕi(g1);
ω(g1) − ω(g2) = ϕi(g1) − ϕi(g2);
. . .
ω(gk−1) − ω(gk) = ϕi(gk−1) − ϕi(gk).
Adding both sides of all the expressions (which results in common terms cancelling
out), we get
ω(g) − ω(gk) = ϕi(g) − ϕi(gk). (23)
Similarly, from (6), it follows that
ω(gk+m) − ω(gk) = ϕi(gk+m) − ϕi(gk). (24)
Taking the difference of (23) and (24), we get
ω(gk+m) − ω(g) = ϕi(gk+m) − ϕi(g). (25)
From (22) and (25), it follows
ω(g(b li,l−i)) − ω(g(l)) = ϕi(g(b li,l−i)) − ϕi(g(l)) = πi(b li,l−i) − πi(l). (26)
Deﬁne a function Q : A → RN such that Q(l) = ω(g(l)). From (26), it now follows
that
Q(b li,l−i) − Q(l) = πi(b li,l−i) − πi(l).
This shows that, by deﬁnition, Q is indeed an exact potential of the corresponding
Consent Game Γϕ.
(ii) implies (i)
Suppose the Consent Game Γϕ admits an exact potential and that this potential is
given by Q: A → R. We will show that ϕ now admits an exact network potential.
We know from Claim 1 that Equal Bargaining Power must be satisﬁed. Hence, for all
ij ∈ g, g ∈ GN,
ϕi(g) − ϕi(g − ij) = ϕj(g) − ϕj(g − ij). (27)
Deﬁne ω: GN → R such that
ω(g) = Q(lg) (28)
32where lg is the non-superﬂuous strategy supporting g. We shall show ω is an exact
network potential for ϕ.
Consider any arbitrary g and the corresponding lg and any ij ∈ g. Let b lij = 0 and
b lik = lg,ik for all k 6= j. From the deﬁnition of an exact potential we conclude that
Q(lg) − Q(b li,lg,−i) = πi(lg) − πi(b li,lg,−i) (29)
Also,
πi(lg) − πi(b li,lg,−i) = ϕi(g(lg)) − ϕi(g(b li,lg,−i)) = ϕi(g) − ϕi(g − ij). (30)
From (28), (29) and (30), it then follows that
ω(g) − Q(b li,lg,−i) = ϕi(g) − ϕi(g − ij). (31)
Now, we claim that
Q(b li,lg,−i) = Q(lg−ij) = ω(g − ij). (32)
We shall prove (32) as follows. First, by the deﬁnition of an exact potential,
πj(b li,lg,−i) − πj(b li,b lj,lg,−i,j) = Q(b li,lg,−i) − Q(b li,b lj,lg,−i,j) (33)
whereb lj is such thatb lji = 0,b ljk = lg,jk for all k 6= i. Moreover,
πj(b li,lg,−i) − πj(b li,b lj,lg,−i,j) = ϕj(g(b li,lg,−i)) − ϕj(g(b li,b lj,lg,−i,j))






Hence, from (33), (34) and (35), we conclude that (32) indeed holds.
To conclude the proof of the assertion, we point out that (27), (31) and (32) implies
that
ϕi(g) − ϕi(g − ij) = ϕj(g) − ϕj(g − ij) = ω(g) − ω(g − ij).
This proves that ω is indeed an exact network potential.
(i) implies (iii)
Consider any g ∈ GN and let ρ1 as well as ρ2 be two arbitrary orders on g. Now
suppose that there exists an exact network potential for ϕ, say ω. We will show that
ϕ has to satisfy the Sums Property.
Assume without loss of generality that the network g consist of exactly k links. Hence,
for order ρ1 on g,
ω(g
ρ1







2 ) − ω(g
ρ1













33Adding both sides and cancelling out common terms, we get
ω(g) − ω(g0) = Sϕ(g,ρ1). (36)
Similarly, we conclude that
ω(g) − ω(g0) = Sϕ(g,ρ2). (37)
Hence, (36) and (37) imply that
Sϕ(g,ρ1) = Sϕ(g,ρ2).
Hence, we conclude that ϕ indeed satisﬁes the Sums Property.
(iii) implies (i)
Suppose that ϕ satisﬁes the Sums Property. Then for any arbitrary network g ∈ GN
consisting of k links and all orders ρ1,ρ2,...,ρT ∈ Xg with T = k!,
Sϕ(g,ρ1) = Sϕ(g,ρ2) = ... = Sϕ(g,ρT) = Sϕ(g) (say).
We proceed now to prove that the function Sϕ: GN → R is an exact network poten-
tial for ϕ.
Take any arbitrary network g ∈ GN with k links and any arbitrary link ij ∈ g. Obvi-
ously, we can select the order ρT ∈ Xg on network g such that ij = τ
ρT
k . Consider the






k−1. But this sequence of links constitutes an order
on g − ij. Call this particular order ρ0
g−ij ∈ Xg−ij. Therefore,






























= ϕi(g) − ϕi(g − ij)
= ϕj(g) − ϕj(g − ij).
This proves that Sϕ: GN → R is indeed an exact network potential for ϕ.
34Proof of Theorem 3.7
In this section we proceed with the development of a proof of Theorem 3.7. The
following two intermediary results are essential for our proof. The ﬁrst one is the
well-known four-cycle property for exact potential games.
Claim 2 (Monderer and Shapley 1996, Corollary 2.9)





i ∈ Ai and all a1
j,a2
j ∈ Aj,














Our proof of Theorem 3.7 mainly rests on the following new insight:
Claim 3 Consider some network g ∈ GN. If i ∈ N0(g) and ϕ ∈ e Φ, then φi(Uϕ,g) =
ϕi(g).
Proof. Let g ∈ GN, ϕ ∈ e Φ, and i ∈ N0(g) be as stated in the assertion.








i∈S ϕi(g|S) and g|S = {ij ∈ g | i ∈ S and j ∈ S}.
Consider any coalition S ⊂ N that includes i. Now, since i ∈ N0(g), we have that
g|S = g|S\{i}. Hence, the payoffs of all players are identical in both networks g|S and













= ϕi(g|S\{i}) + Uϕ,g(S\{i}).
Obviously, since i ∈ N0(g), it holds that ϕi(g|S) = ϕi(g|S\{i}) = τi. Hence,
Uϕ,g(S) − Uϕ,g(S\{i}) = τi.
35This, in turn, implies that
φi(Uϕ,g) = τi ·
X
S⊂N: S3i
(|S| − 1)!(n − |S|)!
n!
= τi = ϕi(g).
This shows the claim.
Proof of Theorem 3.7(a).
For a given ϕ, construct a new payoff function b ϕ(g) = φ(Uϕ,g) for all g ∈ GN. We
construct the non-cooperative game (A, b π) where b π = (b πi)i∈N: A → RN such that
b πi(l) = b ϕi(g(l)) for all l ∈ A. Hence, (A, b π) is the Consent Game corresponding to
b ϕ. We shall ﬁrst show that (A, b π) has an exact potential, and hence by Theorem 3.3,
b ϕ has an exact network potential. This implies that if ϕ is Shapley-consistent in the
sense that ϕ = b ϕ, then ϕ admits an exact network potential as well.
Now, we know from (4) that
φi(Uϕ,g) − φj(Uϕ,g) =
X
S⊂N\{ij}
(|S|)!(n − |S| − 2)![Uϕ,g(S ∪ {i}) − Uϕ,g(S ∪ {j})]
(n − 1)!
which implies that
b ϕi(g) − b ϕj(g) =
X
S⊂N\{ij}
(|S|)!(n − |S| − 2)![Uϕ,g(S ∪ {i}) − Uϕ,g(S ∪ {j})]
(n − 1)!
.
Therefore for any strategy tuple l ∈ A of the Consent Game (A, b π),
b ϕi(g(l))− b ϕj(g(l)) =
X
S⊂N\{ij}
(|S|)!(n − |S| − 2)!









(|S|)!(n − |S| − 2)!





Consider any arbitrary l1
i,l2
i ∈ Ai, l1
j,l2

















b πi(β) − b πi(α) + b πj(γ) − b πj(β) + b πi(δ) − b πi(γ) + b πj(α) − b πj(δ) =




(|S|)!(n − |S| − 2)!
(n − 1)!






(|S|)!(n − |S| − 2)!
(n − 1)!






(|S|)!(n − |S| − 2)!
(n − 1)!






(|S|)!(n − |S| − 2)!
(n − 1)!






(|S|)!(n − |S| − 2)!
(n − 1)!






(|S|)!(n − |S| − 2)!
(n − 1)!






(|S|)!(n − |S| − 2)!
(n − 1)!






(|S|)!(n − |S| − 2)!
(n − 1)!

Uϕ,g(δ)(S ∪ {i}) − Uϕ,g(α)(S ∪ {i})

.
Now, we claim that each of the four expressions in square brackets are zero. Start
with the ﬁrst expression Uϕ,g(α)(S ∪ {j}) − Uϕ,g(β)(S ∪ {j}) for any S ⊂ N\{ij}. α and
β only differ in that player i changes her strategy from l1
i in α to l2
i in β. All other
players keep their strategies unchanged. But from the deﬁnition, both Uϕ,g(α)(S∪{j})
and Uϕ,g(β)(S∪{j}) are independent of strategies chosen by i. Therefore, Uϕ,g(α)(S∪
{j}) − Uϕ,g(β)(S ∪ {j}) = 0. The same holds for the three other bracketed expressions
as well. Hence, by Claim 2, (A, b π) admits an exact potential.
Proof of Theorem 3.7(b).
Let the network payoff function ϕ admit an exact network potential. This implies
by Theorem 3.3 that the corresponding Consent Game Γϕ admits an exact potential.
Let the potential function of the Consent Game corresponding to ϕ be denoted by
P. Suppose to the contrary that the assertion does not hold and assume that ϕ(g) 6=
φ(Uϕ,g) for some g ∈ GN.
Now, we know from the earlier proof that if the payoff function were b ϕ where b ϕ(g) =
φ(Uϕ,g) for all g ∈ GN, then also the corresponding Consent Game has an exact
potential. Let the potential function of the Consent Game corresponding to b ϕ be
denoted by b P.
Claim: There exists a constant C ∈ R such that P(l) = b P(l) + C for all l ∈ A.
37We prove the claim by induction. Let for any i ∈ N, li ∈ Ai, ξ(li) = #{j ∈ N | lij = 1}.
Deﬁne an order ≺ on A such that l ≺ l0 if and only if there exists i ∈ N such that
ξ(li) < ξ(l0
i) and for all j < i, j ∈ N, ξ(lj) = ξ(l0
j). Then, the smallest element
of A with respect to ≺ is given by l0 where l0
ij = 0 for all i,j ∈ N, i 6= j. Set
C = b P(l0) − P(l0). We shall show that if for all l ≺ l
0
, it holds that b P(l) = P(l) + C,
then it is the case that b P(l0) = P(l0) + C.
For every i ∈ N, deﬁne li ∈ A as li
ij = 0 for all j 6= i and li
jk = ljk for all j 6= i, k ∈ N.
Then, li ≺ l and i ∈ N0(g(li)).
Also, by deﬁnition of an exact potential, it must be the case that
πi(l) − πi(li) = P(l) − P(li)























i∈N b ϕi(g(l)) −
P





Now, given that the Shapley value is a feasible allocation, we get that
X
i∈N




From Claim 3 and i ∈ N0(g(li)), ϕi(g(li)) = b ϕi(g(li)) = τi. Taking the difference of
(38) and (39), we get by the induction hypothesis that






P(li) − b P(li)
i
= C.
Hence, we have shown the claim. 
To proceed with the proof of Theorem 3.7(b), we remark that for any l ∈ A, πi(l) −























P(li) − b P(li)
i
= C − C = 0.
Hence, for any l ∈ A,
πi(l) − b πi(l) = πi(li) − b πi(li). (40)
38But we know from i ∈ N0(g(li)) that
πi(li) − b πi(li) = ϕi(g(li) − b ϕi(g(li) = τi − τi = 0
which implies using (40) that
πi(l) = b πi(l)
for any l ∈ A. Hence, ϕ = b ϕ which is a contradiction. This shows the assertion.
Proof of Theorem 4.3
We require the following intermediary result. It states that PSC is necessary for an
ordinal potential to exist.
Claim 4 If the Consent Game Γϕ admits an ordinal potential, then the corresponding
network payoff function ϕ satisﬁes PSC.
Proof. Let Γϕ admit an ordinal potential. Denote this potential function as Q: A →
RN. By contradiction, now assume that ϕ violates PSC. Then, there exists a network
b g and a link ij ∈ b g such that either of the following three conditions hold:
ϕi(b g) − ϕi(b g − ij) > 0 and ϕj(b g) − ϕj(b g − ij) 6 0; (41)
ϕi(b g) − ϕi(b g − ij) < 0 and ϕj(b g) − ϕj(b g − ij) > 0; (42)
ϕi(g) − ϕi(g − ij) = 0 and ϕj(g) − ϕj(g − ij) 6= 0. (43)
We shall show that each of these requirements leads to a contradiction. Consider
the non-superﬂuous strategy proﬁle b l that supports b g. Further, let e l be the non-
superﬂuous strategy proﬁle supporting b g − ij. Then,
e lij =e lji = 0;
b lij =b lji = 1;
e lik =b lik for k 6= i;
e ljk =b ljk for k 6= j;
e lkl =b lkl for k 6= i,j.
Note that





g(e li,b l−i) = g(e lj,b l−j) = g(e li,e lj,b l−i,j) = g(e l) = b g − ij.
Therefore,
πi(e lj,b l−j) = πi(e li,e lj,b l−i,j) = ϕi(b g − ij);
πj(e li,b l−i) = πj(e li,e lj,b l−i,j) = ϕj(b g − ij),
39and
πi(e lj,b l−j) − πi(e li,e lj,b l−i,j) = 0;
πj(e li,b l−i) − πj(e li,e lj,b l−i,j) = 0;
which by deﬁnition of Q as an ordinal potential implies that
Q(e lj,b l−j) − Q(e li,e lj,b l−i,j) = 0;
Q(e li,b l−i) − Q(e li,e lj,b l−i,j) = 0;
This in turn implies that
Q(e lj,b l−j) = Q(e li,b l−i) = Q(e li,e lj,b l−i,j). (44)
Now, suppose (41) holds. Then,
πi(b l) − πi(e li,b l−i) = ϕi(b g) − ϕi(b g − ij) > 0
which by deﬁnition of Q as an ordinal potential implies that
Q(b l) − Q(e li,b l−i) > 0. (45)
Also,
πj(b l) − πj(e lj,b l−j) = ϕj(b g) − ϕj(b g − ij) 6 0
which by deﬁnition of Q as an ordinal potential implies that
Q(b l) − Q(e lj,b l−j) 6 0. (46)
From (45) and (46), it now follows that
Q(e li,b l−i) 6= Q(e lj,b l−j). (47)
But (47) contradicts (44). Hence, we have a contradiction.
It should also be clear that if (42) holds, one can construct a similar proof that leads
us to the desired contradiction.
Finally, if (43) holds,
πi(b l) − πi(e li,b l−i) = ϕi(b g) − ϕi(b g − ij) = 0
which implies by deﬁnition of Q as an ordinal potential,
Q(b l) − Q(e li,b l−i) = 0. (48)
Also, either
πj(b l) − πj(e lj,b l−j) = ϕj(b g) − ϕj(b g − ij) > 0
40in which case, from the deﬁnition of Q as an ordinal potential,
Q(b l) − Q(e lj,b l−j) > 0, (49)
or
πj(b l) − πj(e lj,b l−j) = ϕj(b g) − ϕj(b g − ij) < 0
in which case, from the deﬁnition of Q as an ordinal potential,
Q(b l) − Q(e lj,b l−j) < 0. (50)
In any case, (49) and (50) imply that
Q(b l) − Q(e lj,b l−j) 6= 0. (51)
Now from (48) and (51),
Q(e li,b l−i) 6= Q(e lj,b l−j).
which contradicts (44). Hence, we have arrived at a contradiction. This completes
the proof of Claim 4.
Finally, we are able to construct the proof of Theorem 4.3.
Proof of Theorem 4.3.
Suppose an ordinal potential exists for the Consent Game Γϕ, say Q: A → R. We will
show that there exists an ordinal network potential for the corresponding network
payoff function ϕ. We know from Claim 4 that PSC must be satisﬁed. Hence, for all
ij ∈ g, g ∈ GN,
Sign(ϕi(g),ϕi(g − ij)) = Sign(ϕj(g),ϕj(g − ij)). (52)
Deﬁne ω : GN → R by
ω(g) = Q(lg) (53)
where lg is the non-superﬂuous strategy supporting g. We shall show ω is an ordinal
network potential corresponding to ϕ.
Consider any arbitrary g and the corresponding lg and any ij ∈ g. From the deﬁnition
of ordinal potentials,
Sign(Q(lg),Q(b li,lg,−i)) = Sign(πi(lg),πi(b li,lg,−i)) (54)
whereb lij = 0 andb lik = lg,ik for all k 6= j. But
πi(lg) − πi(b li,lg,−i) = ϕi(g(lg)) − ϕi(g(b li,lg,−i)) = ϕi(g) − ϕi(g − ij). (55)
From (53), (54) and (55), it follows that
Sign(ω(g),Q(b li,lg,−i)) = Sign(ϕi(g),ϕi(g − ij)). (56)
41Now, we claim that
Q(b li,lg,−i) = Q(lg−ij) = ω(g − ij). (57)
We show this assertion as follows. First, by deﬁnition of ordinal potentials,
Sign(πj(b li,lg,−i),πj(b li,b lj,lg,−i,j)) = Sign(Q(b li,lg,−i),Q(b li,b lj,lg,−i,j)) (58)
whereb lj is such thatb lji = 0,b ljk = lg,jk for all k 6= i. However,
πj(b li,lg,−i) − πj(b li,b lj,lg,−i,j) = ϕj(g(b li,lg,−i)) − ϕj(g(b li,b lj,lg,−i,j))






Hence, by (58), (59), (60) and deﬁnition of ω, it follows that
Sign(πj(b li,lg,−i),πj(b li,b lj,lg,−i,j)) = 0
=⇒ Sign(Q(b li,lg,−i),Q(b li,b lj,lg,−i,j)) = 0
=⇒ Q(b li,lg,−i) = Q(b li,b lj,lg,−i,j)
=⇒ Q(b li,lg,−i) = Q(lg−ij) = ω(g − ij) (61)
which proves the claim.
Finally, from (52), (56) and (57), it follows that
Sign(ϕi(g),ϕi(g − ij)) = Sign(ϕj(g),ϕj(g − ij)) = Sign(ω(g),ω(g − ij)).
This proves ω is indeed an ordinal network potential for ϕ.
Proof of Theorem 5.3
Claim 5 (Jackson and Watts 2001, Theorem 1A)
If there exists a function w: GN → R such that [g0 defeats g] ⇐⇒ [w(g0) > w(g) and
g and g0 are adjacent], then there are no improvement cycles.
With this we are able to show assertion 5.3(b).
Claim 6 If ϕ ∈ Φ3, then there are no improvement cycles.
Proof. We have to ﬁnd a function w as deﬁned in Claim 5. But such a function is
given by the ordinal network potential ω. Hence, the result follows.
From this assertion we immediately arrive on assertion 5.3(a) as a corollary to Claim
6.
42Claim 7 If ϕ ∈ Φ3, then there exists at least one pairwise stable network for the corre-
sponding network payoff function.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 5.2 and Claim 6.
With regard to assertion 5.3(c) we remark that PSC is sufﬁcient to guarantee that
all strongly pairwise stable networks are strictly pairwise stable as well. Hence, we
immediately establish the desired assertion.
This completes the proof of all three assertions stated in Theorem 5.3.
Proof of Theorem 5.5
In order to show Theorem 5.5, we use another result due to Jackson and Watts
(2001).
Claim 8 (Jackson and Watts 2001, Theorem 1B)
If the network payoff function satisﬁes no indifference and there are no improvement
cycles, then there exists a function w: GN → R such that [g0 defeats g] ⇔ [w(g) > w(g0)
and g and g0 are adjacent].
To proceed with the proof of Theorem 5.5 we remark that by Claim 8, it follows
that since the network payoff function satisﬁes no indifference and there are no
improvement cycles, there exists a function w : GN → R such that [g0 defeats
g] ⇔ [w(g0) > w(g) and g and g0 are adjacent].
Suppose g0 defeats g. Then, it is either the case that
(i) g0 = g − ij with ϕi(g0) > ϕi(g), or
(ii) g0 = g + ij with ϕi(g0) > ϕi(g)and ϕj(g0) > ϕj(g).
In both (i) and (ii), by PSC, ϕj(g0) > ϕj(g).
Hence, [w(g)−w(g−ij) > 0] ⇔ [g defeats g−ij] ⇔ [ϕi(g)−ϕi(g−ij) > 0 and
ϕj(g) − ϕj(g − ij) > 0].
Also, [w(g) − w(g − ij) < 0] ⇔ [g − ij defeats g] ⇔ [ϕi(g) − ϕi(g − ij) < 0 and
ϕj(g) − ϕj(g − ij) < 0].
Next, let w(g) − w(g − ij) = 0. Then neither g − ij defeats g nor g defeats g − ij
which is impossible by no indifference. Also, if ϕi(g) − ϕi(g − ij) = 0 and ϕj(g) −
ϕj(g − ij) = 0, again neither g − ij defeats g nor g defeats g − ij which is impossible
by no indifference.
So it is trivially the case that [w(g) − w(g − ij) = 0] ⇔ [ϕi(g) − ϕi(g − ij) = 0 and
ϕj(g) − ϕj(g − ij) = 0].
Hence, by deﬁnition, w is an ordinal network potential, showing the assertion.
43Proof of Theorem 5.6
For network payoff functions belonging to Φ2, we prove that a strongly pairwise sta-
ble (and hence strictly pairwise stable) network exists by identifying those networks
that are supported through ordinal potential maximizing strategies in Γϕ. We show
that these particular networks form a strict subset of the set of strongly pairwise
stable networks Ps(ϕ) = P∗(ϕ).
Claim 9 Let ϕ ∈ Φ2 be such that the Consent Game Γϕ = (A,π) admits an ordinal
potential function Q: A → R. if l ∈ A is such that Q(l) = Q(l0) for all l0 ∈ A, then
g(l) ∈ Ps(ϕ).
Proof. Suppose that g = g(l) is such that l ∈ A maximizes the ordinal potential
function Q on A. Now, assume by contradiction that g is not strongly pairwise stable.
Then it is either not LAP or not SLDP. We shall show that both lead to contradictions.
First assume that g is not SLDP. This implies there exists a player i ∈ N and a set of its
neighbors M ⊂ Ni(g) such that ϕi(g\hM) > ϕi(g) where hM = {ij ∈ g|j ∈ M} ⊂ g.
Consider a strategy b li such that b lij = 0 for all j ∈ M and b lij = lij for all j ∈ N\M.
Then, g(b li,l−i) = g\hM. This implies πi(b li,l−i) > πi(l), which in turn implies that
Q(b li,l−i) > Q(l). This contradicts the fact that l is a potential maximizer.
Next lets assume that g is not LAP. Then, there exists a pair i,j ∈ N such that ϕi(g +
ij) > ϕi(g) implies ϕj(g + ij) > ϕj(g). By Lemma 4, ϕj(g + ij) > ϕj(g). Now, given
that ij / ∈ g, there are three possibilities which we delineate as three cases. For each
of these cases we show a contradiction.
CASE 1: lij = 1, lji = 0
In this case, consider a strategy b lj such that b lji = 1, b ljk = ljk for all k 6= i. Then,
ϕj(g + ij) > ϕj(g) ⇒ πj(b lj,l−j) > πj(l) =⇒ Q(b lj,l−j) > Q(l) by deﬁnition of ordinal
potentials which is a contradiction.
CASE 2: lij = 0, lji = 1
In this case, consider a strategy b li such that b lij = 1, b lik = lik for all k 6= j. Then,
ϕi(g+ij) > ϕi(g) ⇒ πi(b li,l−i) > πi(l) =⇒ Q(b li,l−i) > Q(l) by deﬁnition of ordinal
potentials which is a contradiction.
CASE 3: lij = 0 = lji
Consider a strategy b li such that b lij = 1, b lik = lik for all k 6= j. Then, πi(b li,l−i) =
πi(l) = ϕi(g) ⇒ Q(b li,l−i) = Q(l). Consider another strategy b lj such that b lji = 1,
b ljk = ljk for all k 6= i. Then, πj(b li,b lj,l−i,j) = ϕj(g + ij) > ϕj(g) = πj(b li,l−i) ⇒
Q(b li,b lj,l−i,j) > Q(b li,l−i) = Q(l) which contradicts that l is a potential maximizer.
That completes the proof of the claim.
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